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The “Surgical” Legitimacy of Drone Strikes? Issues of
Sovereignty and Human Rights in the Use of Unmanned Aerial
Systems in Pakistan
Abstract
The Revolution in Military Affairs had an important role in providing the United States
Armed Forces the technical instruments necessary to conduct high-risky operations in the
context of Irregular Warfare. The development of these instruments, such as Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAV), allowed the emergence of a discourse of surgical and lean wars by
the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations, whose legitimacy of the
interventions were related to the accuracy and technical superiority of the UAVs. Focusing
in the case of the U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan, this article seeks to debate the legal limits
of the employment of these instruments. Despite the supposed accuracy and visual capacity
of the UAVs, we argue that there are several information on the deaths of civilians, and
legal limitations in the International Humanitarian Law, that constrain the employment of
this instrument, and illegitimate the argument of surgical war.
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Introduction
The use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), or simply drones, has become
the way by which the United States has been dealing with insurgent
movements on the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan since 2004.
According to the data disposed by the platform “Out of Sight, out of Mind,”
over ten years of operations, there were more than 370 strikes performed,
more than 3000 casualties, 22 percent of which were civilians, and less than 2
percent were high priority targets identified by the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA).1
Despite the difficulty in obtaining this information and distinguishing
between civilian and militant deaths, several organizations affirm that these
strikes reached their peak during the Obama administration with more than
330 executions.2 This article argues that an unprecedented number of attacks
resulted from the implementation of autonomous systems that facilitate the
use of force. Once it is possible to actualize violence remotely and with highly
accurate weapon deployment systems, in delicate situations, without much
risk to American military personnel, many political and moral constraints
related to the use of force tend to be excused.3
The so-called “targeted killing” operations, examined by the special
rapporteur of the United Nations, are the subject of great legal controversy,
covering issues of legitimacy, arguments of integrity of the combatants, and
the surgical precision of the instruments in sensitive military tasks.4 The
report provides the following description of targeted killings, a topic of focus
in this article:
“A targeted killing is the intentional, premeditated and deliberate use of
lethal force, by States or their agents acting under color of law, or by an
organized armed group in armed conflict, against a specific individual
who is not in the physical custody of the perpetrator.”5
Many questions have been raised over how the employment of drones by the
United States in the sovereign territory of Pakistan—mainly under the
pretense of Just War—may be illegitimate and inconsistent with the alleged
principles of accuracy and precision.

"Out of sight, out of mind 'Attacks',” May 16, 2014, available at:
http://drones.pitchinteractive.com/.
2 “Drone Wars Pakistan: Analysis,” New America Foundation, April 12, 2014,
available at: http://natsec.newamerica.net/drones/pakistan/analysis.
3 Singer, Peter, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st
Century (New York: Penguin Press, 2009), 319.
4 Philip Alston, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or
Arbitrary Executions," United Nations Human Rights Council, 2010, available at:
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4c07635c2.html.
5 Alston, "Report of the Special Rapporteur," 03
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Based on the experience of these counterinsurgency operations in the
Pakistani territory over the last ten years, the purpose of this article is to
discuss the legal implications involved in the employment of drones in
targeted killing missions. It’s intended to demonstrate that the argument of
surgical precision, associated to the use of drones, is much more a discourse
rationalized by the revolution in military affairs, rather than a substantiation
of the moral and legal engagement with the rules of combat. This argument,
lensed through the principles of Just War and the report of the United
Nations on targeted killing, claims the employment of drones in Pakistan is
incompatible with the idea of Just War, particularly in what concerns the
guarantee of civilian human rights and the sovereignty of the country.

The Revolution in Military Affairs: The Evolving Discourse on
Irregular Warfare
From 1980-90, American think tanks such, as the Rand Corporation, sought
to describe and conceptualize new kinds of threats to United States security in
order to provide defense policy recommendations that were more accurate on
the topic of terrorism. Defining terrorism as an asymmetric threat, Rand
developed a militarized view on the subject, characterizing it as non-state
actors whose unconventional methods had the capacity to promote
surprisingly successful attacks against citizens or State capacities.6 This new
concept of threat became influential in the reorganization of American
weapons systems, as well as the command and control systems in U.S.
military operations.
This advent of new global threats, combined with the emergence of new
informational and computing technologies, contributed to the efficiency of the
United States Armed Forces, especially on the tactical and decision-making
levels. Crucially, the application of informational technologies for new
armaments resulted in the subsequent development of a lean and surgical
modern war philosophy and also inspired the process of technological,
administrative, and political change that characterizes the Revolution in
Military Affairs (RMA).
According to Shimko, the RMA could be understood as a set of interests and
perceptions that evolves through a distinct political-economic context and
begins to constrain the security agenda to the production of new technologies
for war, as well as how it is conducted and commanded.7 The development of
the RMA can be attributed to a number of factors, such as: (1) the murky
outcome of the Vietnam War, responsible for the development of a collective
aversion to grand-scale conflict—known as the Vietnam Syndrome—that often
Bruce Bennett, “Responding to Asymmetric Threats,” in S. Johnson, M. Libicki and
G. Treverton, New Challenges, New Tools for Defense Decisionmaking. (Santa
Monica: Rand Corporation, 2003), 39.
7 Keith Shimko, The Iraq Wars and America’s Military Revolution (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 02.
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compromises the lives of American soldiers and governs the social perception
about the U.S. military campaigns; (2) the profusion of information and
communication technologies with possible applications in new military
technology systems; (3) the perception of a substantial diversification in
national Security threats, which provoked the reorientation of defense policy
and operational concepts.8
Among the technological systems designed under the RMA are systems of
satellite communication and live feeds, Stand-off Weapons (mainly UAVs),
and sensor systems for targeting in Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs).
These innovations enabled not only the development of C4IRS (Command,
Control, Communication, Computing, Information, Reconnaissance and
Surveillance) that optimized “Shock and Awe” campaigns, but also granted
the Armed Forces access and control to the whole flow of information on war,
conforming to the dynamic of network-centric warfare stated by
Cerebrowsky.9 This happened, according to Bellamy, for the enhancement of
surgical strategies in tactics, the acquisition and destruction of data in a
cybernetic environment, and the control of the public information spread
about war in general.10
During this period, the argument that these new tactics and technologies
could be capable of dealing with new asymmetric threats without employing
conventional military equipment became much more influential. The Joint
Publication doctrine of the U.S. military, anticipating a change in
international security, discerned the difference between traditional warfare
and irregular warfare and the necessity for America to operate well under
both contexts.11 While traditional warfare is understood as a violent encounter
between nation states through conventional weapons systems, irregular
warfare involves the struggle between state and non-state actors, in which
surgical means are used for the identification and elimination of enemies in
hostile and populated environments.
Along the same line of reasoning, the work of Harlan Ullman and James
Wade about the “Shock and Awe” strategy suggests that the most efficient way
of fighting asymmetric threats in irregular warfare is to conduct fast and

Ian Buchanan, “Treatise on Militarism,” Simploke 14 (2006): 155; Zbigniew
Brzezinsky, American Security in an Interdependent World: A Collection of Papers
Presented at the Atlantic Council’s 1987 Annual Conference (Lanham, Maryland:
University Press of America, 1989), 03-04.
9 Arthur Cerebrowsky, “Military Responses to the Informational Age,” The RUSI
Journal 145:5 (2000): 27.
10 Christopher Bellamy, “What is information warfare?” in Ron Matthews and John
Treddenick (eds.) Managing the Revolution in Military Affairs (New York: Palgrave,
2001), 61.
11 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the
United States (Washington, D.C.: OSD, 2013), I6-8.
8
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destructive operations in order to incapacitate the enemy.12 This would only
be possible if the force design was capable of effectively using information
technology in order to achieve knowledge, accuracy, agility, and control. It
should be noted that the Department of Defense's (DoD) Quadrennial
Defense Reviews (QDR) highlight this use of emerging technologies, like
UAVs, to deal with growing threats in the international environment. These
documents are a series of publications that reflect changes in international
security, demanding timely alterations in security and defense strategies,
including the use of new technical systems and the development of advanced
weapons. Thus, the 1997 QDR recommended the use of information
technology to provide surveillance capacity in order to predict and disrupt
transnational terrorist threats or for use in irregular warfare.13 Naming the
UAV as an example of a “surgical precision” weapon, the 2006 QDR predicted
that in the near future 45 percent of long-range attacks would be executed by
such machines and announced the duplication of covert capacity within such
systems through the acquisition of Predators and Global Hawks.14 The 2010
QDR considered the use of UAVs as the basis of success in counterinsurgency
and counterterrorist operations, through missions of intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance, especially in the regions of Afghanistan and
Pakistan.15
The implementation of surgical weapons, mainly UAVs, to combat
asymmetric threats became a primary policy during George W. Bush’s
administration. In the 2004 annual State of the Union speech, the President
affirmed that the main characteristic of the Global War on Terror was a
“manhunt” against al-Qaida terrorists that would outrank concerns of
national borders and sovereignty. This way, the United States would never
again have to face terrorist acts similar to September 11th, and the
administration was willing to “face the regimes that hide and help terrorists
and that could provide them nuclear weapons, chemical or biological.”16
Alongside the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns, invoking a prerogative of
“Failed States,” the employment of armed drones became constant in
countries such as Yemen, Somalia and Pakistan, due to their inability of
controlling and keeping track of potential terrorist activities. In what concerns
Pakistan, Bush argued drones were necessary by reason of the fragility of the

Ullman, Harlan and James Wade, Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance
(Washington, D.C.: The National Defense University, 1996), 88.
13 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 1997 (Washington, D.C.:
OSD, 1997), 03-04.
14 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2006 (Washington,
D.C.: OSD, 2006), 46.
15 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2010 (Washington,
D.C.: OSD, 2010), viii.
16 George W. Bush, "The 2004 State of the Union Address," 2004 State of the Union,
Capitol Building, Washington, D.C., 2004, available at:
http://whitehouse.georgewbush.org/news/2004/012004SOTU.asp.
12
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border with Afghanistan (North and South Waziristan) and because the local
authorities are unable to control the traffic of Taliban or al-Qaida’s militants.17
Figure 1: Drone Strikes in Pakistan: Comparison between the Bush
and Obama Administrations18

Despite the increase of drone strikes in Pakistan (Figure 1), the Obama
administration seems to be more skeptical to define the country as a failed
state. In an announcement regarding use of UAVs as a weapons platform,
President Obama rejected the argument of a “war on terror,” opting to define
its practice as a cooperative strategy for counterinsurgency.19
President Obama focused on building an argument that could justify the
operations not as interventions in the context of a global war, but as
cooperative practices that seek for the elimination of mutual problems. This
suggests that the incursion of Taliban and al-Qaida militants into Pakistan are
also a legitimate national security problem for the United States. At the heart
of this discourse is the possibility of deploying drones in counterterrorist
missions without compromising the life of civilians as “collateral damage.”20
The existence of attacks that resulted in the deaths of civilians were constantly
brought up by President Obama, while also justifying that these attacks were
efficient, legal, and morally justifiable. In this case, the focus on legality is
rooted on the affirmation that these actions are part of a Just War in which
Brian Williams, “The CIA’s Covert Predator Drone War in Pakistan, 2004-2010: The
History of an Assassination Campaign,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 33:10 (2010): 871872.
18 "Drone Wars Pakistan: Analysis."
19 Barack Obama, “Obama’s Speech on Drone Policy,” The New York Times, 2013,
available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/24/us/politics/transcript-ofobamas-speech-on-drone-policy.html?_r=3&.
20 Ibid.
17
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the United States is acting in self-defense against an organization—not a
state—after the September 11th attacks.21 The moral component of the drone
strikes resides on their supposed efficiency and the commitment of the Armed
Forces to follow the “rules of engagement” and avoid “collateral damage.”22
Furthermore, the Obama administration stated that it sought the legitimate
use of drones in these operations by affirming that the actions were conducted
both morally, legally, and in accordance with the principles of Just War. Once
described as surgical, these attacks are not characterized as a formal invasion
or intervention in a sovereign territory.
From the given historical background, the development and extensive launch
of advanced surgical weapons in irregular warfare seemingly justifies U.S.
policy that meets modern security demands through drone strikes without
compromising American soldiers’ lives. Indeed, the tactic of using drones
promises the ability of eliminating enemies in complex environments, while
minimizing the political implications of resorting to war. Nevertheless, the
interoperability and the reduction of the personnel due to the RMA’s
technological advancements made irregular combat more common, but not
necessarily more legitimate. To this end, the next section will shed light on the
matters of legality and legitimacy in the employment of drones in military
operations.

The Legal Controversies in Targeted Killing Practices
Targeted killing operations in Pakistan are conducted by both the U.S. Air
Force and the CIA. As it can be observed on Figure 2, the number of deaths in
targeted killing operations with drones presents a steady growth until 2010,
followed by gradual decreases until the beginning of 2014. According to the
Bureau of Investigative Journalism, every year drone strikes result in the
killing of civilians, but the estimate of civilian casualties vary by source. The
New America Foundation, for example, affirms that the number of civilian
deaths by UAV’s attacks for the last ten years vary from 258 to 307, while the
Bureau of Investigative Journalism estimates that these casualties range from
416 to 957, with 168 to 202 of these victims being children. 23 Regardless of
these estimates, the data on civilian victims tends to recognize the difficulty to
distinguish between civilian and militant targets. Interestingly, the United
States does not offer clear information on how they recognize civilians and
“combatants” in drone strikes.

Ibid.
Ibid.
23 "Drone Wars Pakistan: Analysis"; “Get the Data: Drone Wars,” The Bureau of
Investigative Journalism, July, 2014, available at:
http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/drones-graphs/
21

22
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Figure 2: Types of deaths in Drone Strikes in Pakistan, per year24

The United Nations report referenced earlier states that targeted killings are
common and legal practices in the context of formal wars. 25 However, they
have also been occurring without a formal declaration of war or sanctioned
intervention. Thereby, they cannot be automatically justified as legitimate
self-defense act.26 This poses a problem for the Obama administration to
provide a substantiated explanation of its actions in legal terms since it claims
not to be in a declared war against Pakistan, but rather curtailing a terrorist
organization. According to the UN report, the United States only declares an
armed conflict once it has provided a legal basis to commit extrajudicial
killings, thus justifying the deaths of civilians under direct involvement in
hostile activities.27
Therefore, what is intended to be demonstrated in this section is that, even if
there isn’t a specific legislation on the use of UAV in conflicts, there are many
legal principles concerning the issues of the sovereignty of a state and human
rights—both in the absence or in the context of formal conflicts—that the
employment of drones fails to accomplish. With focus on the case of Pakistan,
this article will first illuminate the problematic aspects of Just War arguments
and sovereignty, and then discuss the disrespect to human rights based on the
customary International law.

Just War and Sovereignty
According to Walzer, war is always measured twice: adjectively and
adverbially. Initially, as an adjective, it is measured by the reasons that guided

"Drone Wars Pakistan: Analysis."
Alston, "Report of the Special Rapporteur.”
26 Ibid, 3.
27 Ibid, 16.
24
25

87
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2014

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 7, No. 4

its occurrence and whether it’s just or unjust.28 Afterwards, it is evaluated
adverbially, when it’s possible to confirm if it’s fought in a just or unjust way.
On these grounds, the principles of Just War are divided into justice to war
(Jus ad Bellum), to which arguments of aggression and self-defense result in
war, and justice in war (Jus in bello), to which one considers the behaviors
and actions being conducted in the aggression itself, especially in terms of
proportionality and distinction. In general, these rules are institutionalized by
The Hague and Geneva Conventions. As Walzer also points out, it is possible
for a Just War to be fought through unjust means and an Unjust War to be in
accordance with the rules of engagement. However, the practice of targeted
killings using drones is in discordance to the principles of international laws
in both cases.
It should be emphasized that International Humanitarian Law (IHL) emerged
in a moment when the use of force in international relations was legitimate –
when States had the right to individually resort to war. Nonetheless, as
Bouvier points out, the state is forbidden to spontaneously declare and make
war—in a way the jus ad bellun is converted into jus contra bellum—except
when supported by the Charter of the United Nations.29
The Report of the United Nations on Targeted Killing, then, indicates several
problems related to the practice, mainly in what concerns the employment of
drones by the United States. The biggest issues are caused by an
incompatibility of targeted killing with the United Nations Charter (Jus ad
bellum), and consequently, with the practices and norms of IHL, both for
non-international and international armed conflicts (Jus in Bello).
O’Connell explained that Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations, in
which all members are urged to avoid the use of force against each other, has
only two exceptions, both disposed of in the Chapter IV.30 In case of threats to
peace and acts of aggression, the Security Council has the authority to allow
the use of force to restore international order. Still, according to Article 51,
States are allowed to act in self-defense “in the evidence of an armed attack”
until the Security Council is able to intervene. O’Connell also posed that
Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations covered the use of force
against Failed States.31 It is important to note that the International Court of
Justice has never authorized another State to intervene by the use of force
against non-State groups in violation of another sovereign’s space. For

28 Walzer, Michel, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical
Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 21.
29 Bouvier, Antoine, Direito Internacional Humanitário e Direito dos Conflitos
Armados (Instituto para Treinamento em Operações de Paz, 2011), 15.
30 Mary Ellen O’Connell, "Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of
Pakistan, 2004-2009," Social Science Research Network, November 6, 2009, 13.
31 Mary Ellen O’Connell, “Seductive Drones: Learning from a Decade of Lethal
Operations,” Journal of Law, Information & Science and Faculty of Law (2011): 1415.
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instance, when Uganda claimed the right to use force against non-State actors
in Congo in 2005, the International Court of Justice didn’t allow it.
In the majority of cases, the International Court of Justice is concerned that
armed attacks give legitimacy to self-defense retaliations that are not small
and/or sporadic border incidents.32 In the same line, the IHL considered that,
for the occurrence of international armed conflicts, it was necessary that “any
difference arising between two states and leading to the intervention of armed
forces” had to be independent of its intensity or frequency.33 By this
definition, an armed conflict between states and non-state actors is not to be
automatically considered within the legal parameters of self-defense.
However, if a border incident is not treated as an international armed conflict,
it’s possible, through the IHL, to legitimate the use of state force against nonstate actors. In this situation, the armed groups should be characterized
according to the criteria disposed in the Additional Protocol II of the Geneva
Convention: they should be objectively perceived as an armed group (with a
minimal level of organization and command structure), and be involved in
collective actions against the state; there should be a threshold of what is
considered violence, being that so that acts cannot be isolated incidents, but
historical movements of armed conflicts; and there should be a territorial
restriction of its acts, either in the territory of the state, or in its frontiers.34
As noted by the targeted killing report of the United Nations, all these factors
considered together make it very difficult to justify conflict by al-Qaida or
Taliban on the Pakistani border as an international armed conflict without
further explaining how these entities constitute a part of the IHL. Still,
according to this report, the only factor that could characterize an armed
conflict between States (even Pakistan) and al-Qaida is the fact that its actions
are transnational.35 Therefore, even if there is consent from the “host” state
for a foreign intervention against these armed groups—something that, as
O’Connell and Williams confirm has never happened in the case of Pakistan
and its Tribal Zones – the IHL restrains the use of force against groups that
do not match the criteria, that defines them as a part of the IHL. In this
regard, O’Connell refutes the argument of self-defense used by the United
States to legitimate actions against terrorists.36
Therefore, the practice of targeted killing through the use of drones by the
United States in Pakistan doesn’t find legal basis, and should be characterized
as an indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force that violates the
sovereignty of Pakistan. In this case, considering a state sovereignty as its
independence from and legal impermeability in relation to foreign powers, as
O’Connell, "Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones," 14.
Alston, "Report of the Special Rapporteur," 16.
34 Ibid, 17.
35 Alston, "Report of the Special Rapporteur," 18
36 O’Connell, "Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones," 14
32
33
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well as its exclusive jurisdiction and supremacy over its territory and
inhabitants—a right guaranteed by Article 2 of the U.N. Charter—the fact that
the drone is an uninhabited vehicle and an alleged accurate weapon, doesn’t
make it less pervasive of the Pakistani sovereignty.37 Still, the use of Just War
(Jus ad bellum) to define this practice as legitimate defense is contradictory
since Pakistan wasn’t responsible, by any means, for the attacks of September
11th in the United States. Therefore, nothing justifies the violation of
Pakistani sovereignty, not even arguments of self-defense, or those
concerning the technical capability to eliminate specific enemies.

Technical Limitations and the Disregard for Human Rights
Through the analysis of the report of the United Nations on targeted killing,
the optics of IHL, and of the principles of Just War, the evidence suggests that
the United States has ignored several dispositions of the international
normative system, and kept active this illegal and illegitimate practice for
approximately ten years. Furthermore, it can be said that the way it is
performed also disregards principles of proportionality and distinction,
foreseen by the IHL in the Geneva Conventions—which demand combat be
fought by “just” means. The use of drones isn’t Just since it doesn’t allow a
clear distinction between militants and civilians.38 The categorization of dead
militants is also often based on the unproven speculation of direct
involvement of victims in hostile activities .39
Despite the continuous sophistication of UAVs, the process of target
identification in drones is performed through the construction of “patterns of
life” based on the interpretation of heat signatures produced by the vehicle's
onboard infrared camera. According to Chamanyou, the examination of
patterns of life is made by the fusion between the analysis of social
connections of the targets, and geo-spatial analysis—what he defines as a joint
cartography of the social connections in a specific time-space.40 Whenever a
potential target is located, an investigation examines the different kinds of
information gathered. In the fusion center, this data is associated to the target
registered by the UAV’s heat signature, creating nodular points that originate
a diagram called “matrix of disposal.” Although there are only a few pieces of
quantitative information on the targets, it’s sufficient to classify a determinate
pattern of life as suspect or not. A CIA official, quoted by Chamanyou, states

Myoshi Masahiro, “Sovereignty and International Law,” The State of Sovereignty,
Durham University, 2009, available at:
https://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ibru/conferences/sos/masahiro_miyoshi_paper.
pdf.
38 Làmber Royakkers and Rinie Van Est, “The cubicle warrior: the marionette of
digitalized warfare,” Ethics Inf Technol 12 (2010): 293.
39 Human Rights Clinic, Counting Drone Strike Deaths (New York: Columbia Law
School, 2012), available at:
http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/human-rightsinstitute/COLUMBIACountingDronesFinalNotEmbargo.pdf.
40 Chamanyou, Gregoire, Théorie du Drone (Paris: La Fabrique éditions, 2013), 72-73.
37
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that “once we decide that an individual is an enemy, the people who he is
related to will also be [enemies].”41
This practice of constructing an enemy before identifying him, and
incriminating all those related to him, is extremely controversial and
insufficient to properly classify those on the ground as enemies.42 Maybe the
most elucidative case of this insufficiency of technical instruments is the
drone strike in Datta Khel in March of 2011, when a group of nineteen to
thirty civilians was killed after the identification of “suspicious” heat
signatures in the area.43
The IHL foresees that the distinction between civilian and combatants is
necessary in order to avoid purposeful or accidental strikes against civilian
populations.44 The Additional Protocol I of 1977 for the Geneva Conventions
of 1949, adds Article 43 (2), which states that members of the Armed Forces
will always be considered direct participants in hostilities.45 Article 51 (3),
however, affirms that civilians must always be protected, unless they took
direct participation in hostilities.
Even if the IHL allows attacks on civilians directly involved in hostile
activities, the situation doesn’t apply to the practice in Pakistan, as there is
controversy concerning the term “direct involvement.” According to the
International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC), for an action to be considered
a direct participation in hostilities, it’s necessary to accomplish the following
cumulative characteristics: 1) there must be a principle of aggression that
directly results in the act and impact on the life of civilians or on military
operations; 2) the aggression needs to be a result of an organized and planned
action; 3) and the act must be associated with the support of military force.46
The ICRC reveals the complexity inherent to understanding the status of
those killed in State violence during armed conflicts. As the ICRC poses in
case of doubt about the participation of civilians in hostilities—by the
inexistence of any evidence that proves it—the civilian protection article must
be applied a priori.47

Ibid, 76.
Ibid, 74; Alston, "Report of the Special Rapporteur," 08.
43 Chamanyou, Théorie du Drone, 74-75.
44 Melzer, Nils, Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in
Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law (International Comitee of the
Red Cross, 2009), 04.
45 “Protocolo Adicional às Convenções de Genebra de 12 de Agosto de 1949 relativo à
Proteção das Vítimas dos Conflitos Armados Internacionais,” Gabinete de
Documentação e Direito Comparado, 1979, available at:
http://www.gddc.pt/direitos-humanos/textos-internacionaisdh/tidhuniversais/dih-prot-I-conv-genebra-12-08-1949.html.
46 Melzer, Interpretative Guidance, 16.
47 Ibid, 75-76.
41

42
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As the report of the United Nations states, the United States, in a very
contradictory practice, has refused to present the basis by which they qualify
“killed militants” as direct participants in hostilities. They also present the
drone operators as capable of performing this distinction on their own.48
Consider, however, that by some accounts less than 2 percent of the targets in
Pakistan in the last ten years were high profile insurgents, while the rest of the
“collateral victims” were alleged combatants (as perceived by heat
signatures.)49 Defining insurgents as combatants, without granting them the
option of surrendering and of facing a trial, has become a justifiable military
practice during both Bush and Obama administrations—a strong point of
concern for targeted killing operations. Therefore, in the absence of
arguments that proves the existence of an international armed conflict, and
lacking information regarding the technical capacity of the UAV’s to
distinguish between combatants and civilians, the evidence affirms the
illegitimate character of drone deployment.
As O’Connell explained, besides the principle of distinction, there are other
principles that need to be considered by the deployment of drones in targeted
killing operations, such as the “necessity” and “proportionality” principles.50
In the first case, it’s fundamental to demonstrate that the use of military force
is the only way to reach the military objective; in the case of proportionality,
the strikes must have an element of discrimination so as to avoid incidental
casualties of civilians.51 In both cases, considering the amount of deaths
caused in Pakistan in the last ten years, and the discussion presented here
about legal contradictions, it can be reasonably concluded that the
employment of drones in Pakistan exemplifies an unnecessary and
disproportionate use of force. In short, the practice of targeted killing using
drones fails to respect humanitarian principles that would guarantee
legitimacy to the operations.

Conclusion
The U.S. practice of using drones to perform preemptive strikes as a
counterinsurgency strategy has been extremely effective to eliminate high
profile targets in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Despite the evident affront to the
sovereignty of Pakistan, the argument used by the United States to legitimate
these extrajudicial killings is that these are surgically precise strikes with
minimal to zero civilian casualties, and no formal intervention by American
troops. This argument of timely and accurate operations is historically built
on the documents and strategies produced by the DoD and other military
institutions in America, and now resides in the practices of recent presidential
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administrations to create a sense of lean, bloodless and, consequently, Just
War.52
However, the great number of civilian collateral deaths in ten years of
operations raises doubts about the legitimacy of the surgical nature of drones
and consequently incites investigations on their legality. In the case of
Pakistan, this article demonstrates that the use of drones in many ways
disregards the principles of Just War. In fact, it’s possible to suggest that not
only is this practice disruptive to the moral and ethical system of just war, but
may be illegal.
Therefore, despite the capabilities of drones to operate in high risk
environments and to minimize the casualties of military personnel, there are
many doubts concerning the technical capacity of this instrument, such as to
conduct operations for long hours, to be a “persistent presence” in
surveillance missions, and the legal implications of its use as a platform for
other weaponry.53 Taking these issues into consideration, this article
emphasizes the need for a greater enforcement of legal conduct of U.S.
military operations. Greater access to information on how drone operations
are able to distinguish civilians and combatants, as well as detailed
information on actual strikes, would help establish the legitimacy of such
targeted killings.54
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